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While the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) is seen to be an African success story, in order to obtain some sense of the impact 
of CEDAW in African legal systems, this article considers cases in which CEDAW 
provisions on the family have been invoked in those jurisdictions and provides a snapshot of 
key issues identified by the Committee in the case law, including changes in Constitutions. 




The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) seems to be an African success story. 1  Out of 54 States, only two, Somalia and 
Sudan, have failed to sign or ratify the Convention.  Advocates in African states have 
embraced the Convention and used it to hold states accountable for its implementation. They 
have brought test cases using the Convention to advance women’s legal claims. The judiciary 
has been largely receptive to these claims. In most cases, African leaders and governments 
have been open to the lobbying efforts of civil society, and have sought to honour, 
normatively, if not always rhetorically, the pledges that they have made by ratifying CEDAW 
and other human rights instruments, but also in their participation of the Universal Peer 
Review process and at international conferences such as Beijing in 1995 and beyond.  
African governments have pointed to their ratification of CEDAW as proof of their 




well with international aid donors some of whom require a commitment to gender equality as 
a precondition to engagement. 
The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals, since supplemented by the Sustainable 
Development Goals, have acted as a further impetus to action by putting, as they both do, 
gender equality at the centre of development initiatives.3  Reinforcing all this has been the 
development and strengthening of regional and sub-regional human rights initiatives, not 
least the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of African Women, 2003 (the Maputo Protocol or the African Women’s 
Protocol).4 The Protocol has been ratified by 40 States.5 
It is self-evident that much of the discrimination experienced by women on the African 
continent arises from discriminatory family laws. 6 The issues covered in article 16 of 
CEDAW, equality in entry to and exit from marriage, equal distribution of property on 
divorce (and death) and the same rights and responsibilities with regard to children, along 
with a prohibition of forced and early marriage, are consistently flagged up as problematic for 
women. However, in concluding its dialogue with Senegal, the CEDAW Committee 
remarked on the ‘lack of cases in which discrimination has been invoked, showing the limited 
efficiency of the formal appeal mechanisms.’7 In this article, in order to obtain some sense of 
the impact of CEDAW in African legal systems, I consider cases in which CEDAW 
provisions on the family have been invoked.8 I also attempt to provide a snapshot of key 
issues identified by the Committee in the case law, including changes in Constitutions.9 But 
first it is necessary to consider the challenges of applying international standards to local 
contexts. 
II. CHANGING LAWS: CHANGING PEOPLE? 
Writing about women’s rights, Feryal Cherif (2015: 9)  acknowledges the difficulties of 
considering explanations for regression or advancement of human rights in isolation because 
doing so ‘often leads to multiple and sometimes conflicting conclusions about which 
accounts best explain change.’10 She is not alone. Andrew Byrnes and Marsha Freeman 
(2012) identify the challenges of making a causal connection between ratification of CEDAW 
and legal changes made in a specific context.11 There has been a marked increase in literature 
querying the claims made for and about the efficacy of human rights. 12 It is a telling 




and behaviour comes from political scientists, sociologists, legal anthropologists and, 
occasionally philosophers.13   
Legal anthropologist, Engle Merry (2017), refers to a process of vernacularisation which 
involves making norms locally relevant. Catharine Mackinnon (2017) uses Lorenz’s 
‘butterfly effect’ (the effect of one action - the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil, on 
another event, the setting off of a tornado in Texas) to reflect on how her forty years of 
advocacy for women’s rights has led to many changes in law and culture. These include 
accepting that sexual harassment constitutes a form of violence and that the ratification of 
human rights instruments has a positive effect on state behaviour because it forces them to 
behave better and gives citizens the tools to ensure that this happens.14 To this Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks (2013) add emulation, or the desire of states to be seen to be in 
step with other states and with international consensus.  It is a positive example of ‘peer 
pressure’ at work.15 
Abdullahi An Na’im NEED REFERENCE puts forward a methodology for reconciling 
international human rights with local viewpoints. This calls for internal discourse at the local 
level during which all members of the community/communities work together to ascertain 
their values. This process is then followed by cross-cultural dialogue with the international 
system. The goal is to create cultural legitimacy for human rights and in that way to obtain 
local ‘buy in’.  In many ways this is the work that many local Non-Government 
Organisations do with variable rates of success.16 The African Protocol, in article 17 is 
insistent on the importance of including women in the framing of positive cultural values 
while in its joint General Recommendation with the Children’s Rights Committee, the 
CEDAW Committee stated: 
‘The Committees recommend that the States parties to the Conventions ensure that any 
efforts undertaken to tackle harmful practices and to challenge and change underlying social 
norms are holistic, community based and founded on a rights-based approach that includes 
the active participation of all  relevant stakeholders, especially women and girls’.17 
There has been a rise in the use of indicators to trace progress made.  The problems of using 
indicators as measures of progress are well documented (see Engle-Merry, Davies and 
Kingsbury, 2015; Engle-Merry, 2016) . These include the use of different methodologies and 
data sets to collate the findings. There is also the problem, identified in the Mid-Term Review 
of the African Women’s Decade, of the variability and availability of reliable data sets. It 
relies on the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index 2015 for its data. In so doing it 
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identifies that 34 out of 54 African countries are included in the Index out of 148 countries.18  
There are 193 States within the UN family. Where are the data for the others?  In his analyses 
of the uses and misuses of development statistics, Morten Jerven (2013) queries the efficacy 
of demanding ‘evidence based policy’ when the statistical evidence on which policies are 
made is itself incomplete, invented, out of date and flawed. Despite these shortcomings, it is 
still worth acknowledging that reports on gender equality produced by institutions such as the 
World Bank have enormous impact. The Nigerian representative told the CEDAW 
Committee: 
‘The review of family law currently under way took as its basis a comprehensive 
study, sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), designed to identify all discriminatory provisions in the relevant 
legislation at all levels.’19 
Another consideration is the status of international instruments in local law. In practice, it 
does not seem to matter whether a state is a monist or dualist one, that is, whether ratification 
leads to direct implementation, or whether incorporation into the national law is required 
before the Convention can take effect. Sometimes states move between the two or have a 
hybrid model. In its 2017 dialogue with the Rwandan delegation, CEDAW was told that the 
Convention could be invoked and applied directly in national courts. However, the 
Committee also learned that an amendment to its 2015 Constitution meant that ‘the 
Constitution and organic laws take precedence over international treaties’. In its concluding 
observations, the Committee indicated a preference for the position that pertained prior to the 
constitutional change where international treaties took precedence over the constitution and 
organic laws.20 Concluding its examination of Niger in July 2017, the Committee noted that, 
while article 171 of the Constitution gave precedence to ratified international treaties over 
national legislation, still: 
‘ … Act No. 62-11 of 16 March 1962 and Act No. 2004-50 of 22 July 2004 give precedence 
to the application of customary law over civil law in most personal status matters, including 
marriage, divorce, direct descent, inheritance, settlement of assets and wills and in relation to 
property ownership, adversely affecting women and girls.”21 
However, an examination of case law shows that, in dualist states, many judges are willing to 
overlook the non-incorporation of a Convention into domestic law. They regard the State’s 
ratification as a manifestation of a commitment to honour obligations undertaken at the 
international level (pacta sunt servanda).22 
III. ON ‘UNIVERSALITY’ 




The implementation and prioritization of international norms at the domestic level poses a 
particular challenge with respect to family law. The main difficulty for all states around the 
world is respecting article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which 
provides in part: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty.’ All regions have developed some ‘mediatory’ interpretive 
tools in their attempts to reconcile the local with the global. For Europe, this comes in the 
form of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation; for Asia, politicians claim ‘Asian values’; 
African leaders talk of ‘African cultures and traditions’ while article 43 of the Arab Charter 
proffers its own, hard to square, solution of interpreting human rights through the prism of 
both international and domestic law.23 
 Pluralism in family formation and construction was anticipated from the very 
beginning of the United Nations.  Johannes Morsink’s  account of the drafting of article 16 
(on family) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, shows clearly that States were 
agreed that individual States should be left to decide on form and formalities of personal 
status laws (Morsink, 2000: ch. 7). The provisos were that that there should be consent of 
both parties to marriage and that they should be of marriageable age. Equality was also a 
cornerstone.  This interpretation has cascaded down the UN human rights system. CEDAW 
General Recommendation 21 on Family notes:  
‘The form and concept of the family can vary from State to State, and even between regions 
within a State. Whatever form it takes, and whatever the legal system, religion, custom or 
tradition within the country, the treatment of women in the family both at law and in private 
must accord with the principles of equality and justice for all people, as article 2 of the 
Convention requires’.24  
It is worth noting that in almost all systems the equality principle seems to apply to 
heterosexual marriages. States appear to have some leeway in the recognition that they give 
to LGBTI unions (see further Banda and Eekelaar, 2017). CEDAW addressed same-sex 
marriages in its General Recommendation No.29 where it acknowledged that not all States 
recognize same-sex marriages or partnerships:   
‘Certain forms of relationships (i.e. same-sex relationships) are not legally, socially or 
culturally accepted in a considerable number of   States parties. However, where they are 
recognized, whether as a de facto union, registered partnership or marriage, the State party 
should ensure protection of economic rights of the women in these relationships’. 
On the African continent, South Africa, whose constitution guarantees freedom from 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, recognizes same-sex marriages.  The Civil 




heterosexual ones.25 By way of contrast, the constitutions of both Kenya and Zimbabwe 
follow the drafting in the Arab Charter and explicitly exclude the inclusion of same-sex 
relationships by defining marriage in heterosexual terms.26 Similarly, the Nigerian legislature 
has passed a law prohibiting same-sex marriage.27An attempt to challenge it has been 
unsuccessful (see Chinwuba Onuoru-Oguno, 2017: 238 ).  In other African states, the 
criminalization of homosexuality puts paid to any idea of people marrying someone of the 
same sex.  If anything, a report by the Human Dignity Trust  points to lesbian women being 
pressured into marriage with men, as a ‘cure’ for or to hide their sexual orientation (Human 
Dignity Trust, 2016). 
IV. EQUALITY V. EQUITY 
Equality is considered to be jus cogens, or peremptory norm.28  UN human rights instruments 
and jurisprudence speak to the importance of substantive equality whereby states ensure that 
their laws do not contain discriminatory provisions, whilst also ensuring that everyone in the 
society has the possibility to enjoy the rights in practice.29  This view of equality has been 
reinforced in regional systems, notably the Inter-American and African.30  However, this is 
not universal. The Arab Charter, 2004 contains the standard non-discrimination and equality 
before the law provisions but then also provides in article 3(3): 
‘Men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and obligations within the 
framework of positive discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic Shariah, 
other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments. Accordingly, each State party 
pledges to take all the requisite measures to guarantee equal opportunities and effective 
equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all the rights set out in this Charter.’ 
There are States on the African continent which are States parties to CEDAW, the African 
Charter and also the Arab Charter. When it comes to family law, which model of equality are 
they applying? Is it the first sentence in article 3(3) of the Arab Charter, which echoes the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam31 with its religious framing of rights and its 
insistence on a complementarity model of equality or equity; or is it the second sentence 
whose demand that states guarantee equal opportunities and effective equality, mirrors 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25 and its demand for substantive equality?32 It is 
singularly unhelpful that the Arab Charter cites both the Cairo Declaration as well as the 
International Bill of Rights (which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) as the 




CEDAW, Saudi Arabia acknowledged that there were interpretive differences with respect to 
equality and the roles of men and women: 
‘The Islamic Shariah respects these natural differences and accords women a privileged 
position in order to achieve justice for her. For example, it charges the man with earning a 
living to provide for himself and his wife as compensation for the woman’s role as conceiver, 
child bearer and mother.’33 
This regional variation also matters because of a potential clash of norms.  The Arab Charter 
is an instrument of the Arab League which has nine African states as members (Algeria, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,) all of which have 
ratified the African Charter and five of which have also ratified CEDAW, some with 
reservations, others not. Egypt is the only Arab League State to have reservations to the 
equality provisions of the African Charter.34 Only three States have ratified the African 
Women’s Protocol: Djibouti, Libya and Mauritania.35  This normative pick and mix creates 
uncertainty and leaves women open to discrimination. 36 It is for this reason that CEDAW is 
insistent on equal rights between men and women (see Facio and Morgan, 2009).  
As many jurisdictions have plural legal systems, we also need to unpack the idea of equality.  
Equality with whom?  Equality between men and women generally, or equality between men 
and women in the operation of one of the plural normative orders, or equality between 
women regardless of which normative order is applying37  (for further discussion see Mujuzi, 
2019). 
The definitive (legal interpretation) answer to the equity v. equality question can be found in 
the African Commission case Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Egypt. 
Two human rights NGOs brought this case on behalf of four Egyptian women who had been 
arrested while protesting on the streets of Cairo. They were detained and mistreated while 
held by the authorities. The communication alleged many violations, including a breach of 
articles 2, 3 and 18(3) of the African Charter on discrimination and equality before the law.  
The complaint also cited CEDAW and the African Protocol, despite Egypt not having ratified 
or signed the latter.38 The African Commission upheld their communication. In making a 
finding of violations of articles 2, 3, and 18(3), the Commission used the definitions of 
equality found in CEDAW and the mirror provision in article 1(f) of the African Women’s 
Protocol. 39 In its analysis on gender based violence, the Commission relied on CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 19 as well as case law from the Inter-American Commission, 




prohibiting gender based violence and indeed discrimination on grounds of sex and gender.40  
The case also highlights the importance of civil society organisations in highlighting human 
rights violations against women.41 In October 2017, the court that oversees the West African 
sub-regional bloc, ECOWAS, also cited CEDAW, the ICCPR, the UDHR and the African 
Protocol on Women’s Rights in its findings on a case on gender-based violence brought 
against Nigeria.42 
As already noted, another point of difference between the two women’s treaties includes the 
fact that the African Protocol allows polygyny but CEDAW does not.43  In her discussion of 
the approaches of the two treaties to the issue of polygyny,  Celestine Nyamu-Musembi 
(2013) is critical of the CEDAW approach. Which outcome does justice to the woman: the 
one that denies polygyny in the interests of equality, ostensibly for women, but which has the 
effect of leaving a woman in a de facto polygynous union without remedy, or one that 
recognises her and provides protection? 
V. ON RESERVATIONS 
An examination of the CEDAW’s engagement with African States suggests that t he 
existence of plural legal systems with different laws and formalities for different groups 
poses a major problem in both the interpretation and implementation of the Convention.44 
While reservations may breach what Rebecca Cook (1990) calls the integrity of the 
Convention, the States that have entered reservations have at least articulated the problem and 
made clear their difficulties in squaring the domestic laws with the international 
requirements. Moreover, as Jane Connors  has noted, the many reservations to article 16 of 
CEDAW undermine the object and purpose of CEDAW which is the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women, and indeed of article 18(3) of the African Charter, which is 
the elimination of every discrimination against women (Connors, 2013a: 573-4) (emphasis 
added). 
Religious reservations, framed as respect for plural communities’ personal status laws, are 
also unlikely to be undone in politically fraught environments. In a 2017 report on the impact 
of fundamentalism, the UN Independent Expert on Culture noted that States were using their 
reservations to human rights instruments such as CEDAW to counter fundamentalists who 
tried to claim that the state had betrayed the religion.45  The entering and keeping of the 
reservations were used to show respect for the religion. Byrnes and Freeman (2012: 19) note 




altered ‘traditional Islamic rights and responsibilities between the spouses’, and specifically 
property distribution on divorce. The authors observe that this may suggest ‘considerably 
more flexibility than commonly seen in States in which Islamic law affects even part of the 
population’ (Byrnes and Freeman, 2012: 20; see also Musawah, 2017).  CEDAW uses the 
experience of States with similar religious leanings to encourage states to consider uplifting 
their reservations.46 
 It is also worth noting that, while most States do not enter reservations to CEDAW, this does 
not mean that they implement the full Convention either.47  Moreover, although the focus is 
often on Islam, other religions also wield influence. In deference to Christian religious 
sensibilities, Rwanda and Uganda have both refused to ratify the African Women’s Protocol 
because of article 14 which has a limited right to abortion.  Conversely, women’s rights 
advocates in Zimbabwe invoked the Bible in their successful demand that the government 
legislate against domestic violence (see Christiansen,. 2009:  179, 183). 
CEDAW has engaged States on reservations by way of General Recommendations, 
Statements and in dialogue, beseeching them to uplift the reservations.48 These initiatives 
have met with some success (Byrnes and Freeman, 2012: 10-12).  Tunisia and Egypt have 
withdrawn reservations to article 9(2) which linked the nationality of children to their father 
only. However, Egypt has retained its reservation to article 16 in which it justifies unequal 
distribution of property on divorce by reference to the differing obligations placed on men 
and women by the Sharia. While CEDAW has highlighted the centrality of article 5 on 
stereotyping and emphasized to States their role in eradicating gender stereotypes, States such 
as Niger still retain reservations to key CEDAW provisions, for example: 
‘The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that the provisions of article 2, 
paragraphs (d) and (f), article 5, paragraphs (a) and (b), article 15, paragraph 4, and article 16, 
paragraph 1 (c), (e) and (g), concerning family relations, cannot be applied immediately, as 
they are contrary to existing customs and practices which, by their nature, can be modified 
only with the passage of time and the evolution of society and cannot, therefore, be abolished 
by an act of authority’.49  
The poor life chances experienced by women and girls in Niger, which include some of the 
highest rates in the world of early, indeed child, marriage and maternal mortality, speak to the 
importance of States taking article 5 seriously. Article 5, together with article 2(f) enjoining 
States to ‘take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women’ 




Group on Laws and Practices that Discriminate against Women, in its report on the family, 
reinforces the view of CEDAW in this regard.50 
The challenge, in a world that celebrates diversity, is how to respect differences while 
honouring the pledge of equality?  John Eekelaar’s concept of cultural voluntarism has much 
to commend it and has the added advantage of being in keeping with the Committee’s often 
expressed view that neither religious interpretation, nor claims for cultural exceptionalism 
can be allowed to get in the way of the central focus of the Convention: equality between 
men and women. 
‘While it (cultural voluntarism) upholds the right of individuals to practise their culture, and 
should not attempt to undermine a culture though denigration or humiliation of its members, 
whether it supports a culture may depend on contingent judgements of its value: it need not 
consider all of them as being worth promoting or beyond criticism. It is legitimate (indeed 
important) for the state to encourage openness and toleration within the community, but that 
does not require it to sustain cultural practices into the future for no reason other than that 
people practise them today or defer to attempts by contemporaries to compel subsequent 
generations to act in the same way as they do’ (Eekelaar, 2013:30)51 
 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
In 1960, the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan delivered what has become known as 
the ‘winds of change’ speech.  It was an acknowledgement that decolonization was 
inevitable.  Macmillan stated that the aim of  the British government was  to encourage the 
creation of  a society which respects the rights of individuals - a society in which individual 
merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political 
or economic.’ 52  The political transition did come, but women were short-changed. The 
constitutions passed down during the transition from colonialism to independence privileged 
the preservation of customary law and religion with respect to family law.  The Constitutions 
contained human rights bills with non-discrimination provisions, but these provisions did not 
apply to family law, thus making discrimination against most African women legal.53   
It has taken time, but it is clear that the era of ring-fencing family laws from the non-
discrimination provisions are almost at an end.  There has been a raft of Constitutional reform 
among CEDAW ratifying States seeking to uphold CEDAW article 2(a) which requires 
States to ensure that their Constitutions are Convention compliant. Most Anglophone African 
States now have Constitutions that uphold equality for all before the law and that no longer 




Constitutions. However, it usually goes on to identify the gap between having a supreme law 
that requires that there not be discrimination on grounds of sex and national laws, including 
family laws, that still retain discriminatory provisions.55  It is also noteworthy that, whatever 
the Constitutional arrangements, the Committee always comments on the gap between norms, 
the de jure position, and practice, the de facto position.56 In so doing, the Committee 
reinforces the interconnectedness of article 16 to other Convention provisions, not least 
articles 2(f) on modifying or abolishing discriminatory customs and practices, 5 (a) on gender 
stereotyping, 14 (2) (g) on land and 15 (1) on equality before the law.57  
It is also worth noting that some Constitutions in Federal States devolve legislative power, 
meaning that there is a real problem in getting the provisions of domesticated international 
instruments through to State level because of the distribution of powers in the constitution 
(Chinyere, Millicent and Elizabeth, 2018). 
VII. DOMESTIC CASE LAW 
1. Zimbabwe 
The Zimbabwean case of Mudzuru and Tsopodzi v. Ministers of Justice and Women’s 
Affairs58 yielded a human rights rich analysis on child marriage and specifically the setting of 
different ages of marriage for boys and girls.   Two female litigants brought a Public Interest 
challenge, arguing that section 22(1) of the Marriage Act, which permitted girls to marry at 
16 if they had the consent of a parent or guardian (and boys at age 18) breached section 78(1) 
of the Zimbabwean Constitution: ‘Every person who has attained the age of eighteen years 
has the right to found a family.’ They also challenged the Customary Marriages Act for 
failing to specify a minimum age of marriage at all. 59   
 The State argued that, as one could found a family without being married, age was irrelevant. 
The applicant’s lawyers pointed out that a person under 18 could not marry and therefore 
could not consent to found a family.60  The applicant’s lawyers also disputed the State’s case 
that sought to justify different ages of marriage for men and women because girls mature 
faster, arguing that this constituted discrimination on grounds of sex and gender in breach of 
section 56 of the Constitution, as well as stereotyping.61  The constitutional prohibition on 
marrying under the age of 18 applied to both males and females. The applicant’s lawyers 
elaborated on stereotyping, noting that it had the effect of denying girls an education and 
exposing them to harmful practices. In the last section of their submission, the applicants’ 
lawyers turned to section 46 of the Constitution which required the State to honour its 
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international obligations.62 They cited CEDAW article16(1) (c) (d) and (f).  They also 
invoked article 2(c) of precursor to CEDAW, the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 1967. 63 
The judgment, which found for the applicant,  provided a detailed analysis of the 
developments on human rights law on early and child marriage.64 Article 16(2) of CEDAW 
which prohibits child marriage was analysed. It was noted that it did not actually set a 
minimum age of marriage. However, the Court referred to the Children’s Rights Convention 
(CRC) noting: 65  
‘Although the CRC did not specify the age of eighteen as the minimum age for marriage, in 
defining “a child”, it provided the CEDAW Committee and the CRC Committee with the 
basis for declaring the minimum age of marriage to be eighteen years.  This is because 
Article 16(2) of the CEDAW provides in express terms that the “marriage of a child shall 
have no legal effect”.’66 
After exploring the gendered impact of child marriage on girls, the Court went on to cite 
article 21 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990, which 
Zimbabwe had ratified (along with the other Conventions mentioned) and which expressly 
outlawed marriage before the age of 18 and enjoined States to protect girls from 
discriminatory customary practices.67  Returning to its analysis of the UN treaties, the Court 
cited statistics from the Children’s Rights Committee on the prevalence of early marriage as 
well as the views of both the Human Rights Committee the Committee on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights. The latter two Committees had recommended that the Zimbabwean 
government should equalize ages of marriage.68 The Court also quoted extensively from a 
UNICEF report on the negative consequences of early marriage.  On CEDAW, the Court 
noted: 
‘The comment by the CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation 21 para. 38 was to 
the effect that provisions such as those of s 22(1) of the Marriage Act, which provided for 
different ages for marriage for girls and boys, assumed incorrectly that girls have a different 
rate of intellectual development from boys or that their stage of physical and intellectual 
development at marriage was immaterial.  The Committee recommended that these 
provisions be abolished.’ 
The Court went on; 
‘The CEDAW Committee in making the comment in General Recommendation 21 para. 38 
proceeded on the basis that it was common cause that the coming into effect of Article 1 of 
the CRC and Article 21 (2) of the ACRWC rendered provisions such as those contained in s 
22(1) of the Marriage Act, and any other law authorising marriage of a person aged below 
eighteen years, inconsistent with the obligations of Zimbabwe under international human 




the impugned statutory provisions would be consistent with the fulfilment by Zimbabwe of 
the obligations it undertook in terms of the relevant conventions and the Charter.  The 
question was when the abolition would take place.’69  
Recalling article 18 on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 to the effect that 
a State that ratifies a Convention must be seen to be willing to give effect to it, the Court 
noted that Zimbabwe was obliged to honour its clearly stated commitments.  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that marriage was central to the foundation of a family and thus a child under the 
age of 18 could not found a family.  Child marriage was prohibited regardless of the legal 
system in operation.  It therefore ruled that section 22(1) of the Marriage Act was invalid as it 
violated section 78 of the Constitution. 
This case is impressive because it shows what a court, well-versed in both human rights law 
and its application, can achieve.  This in turn speaks to the importance of initiatives such as 
that run by the Commonwealth Secretariat to train judges.70 As the Unity Dow and Sarah 
Longwe cases71 showed, sometimes women activists can bring their own experiences to bear 
in litigation which has the result of taking one person’s story and bringing about change for 
an entire group.  
Change may be due to many factors coming together.  An example concerning early marriage 
has involved a coalition of civil society organisations such as PLAN and Girls Not Brides 
working with local agents, UN human rights Committees, UN agencies including UNICEF 
and the UN General Assembly.72 All have worked with and challenged governments to 
change their laws.73 They have been buttressed in this by courts. A news report noted that 
following the 2017 UN General Assembly meeting and resolution, the Presidents of Zambia, 
Uganda and Malawi all pledged their support to end child marriage by 2030. Malawi had 
already outlawed child marriage along with Chad, Gambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
2. Swaziland 
You know that you are in for a pro-woman judgement when a court prefaces its decision with 
the following words: 
‘This case is but the latest in a continuing series brought in many countries of the world by 
women in their attempts to redress what they claim to be discriminatory laws and practices 
which operated unfairly against women. These precepts and practices have deprived women 
of rights which were freely available to men, and kept women in a position of inferiority and 
inequality, in the various societies in which they live, work, pay their taxes, and raise their 
families, despite the fact that women contribute substantially to the growth and development 




In this case, the Attorney-General was appealing a decision of the Swaziland High Court in 
its interpretation of the Deeds Registry Act.  The case had been brought by a well-known 
women’s rights activist, Doo Aphane. She had sought to jointly register a piece of land which 
she had bought with her husband to whom she was married in community of property. In 
Swaziland, a marriage in community of property bestows ‘marital power’ on the husband 
who is then considered responsible for administering property, including that of the wife.  
The couple had decided, on marriage, to keep their own surnames given at birth.  The wife 
was told that the property could not be registered jointly in their respective names, or solely 
in her name.  This was reflected in section 16(3) of the Deeds Registry Act and in the practice 
of the staff at the Deeds Registry: 
‘The immovable property had to be registered in the name of my husband as required by the 
aforesaid section and hence the Deeds Registry Office will not accept the registration of the 
property in our joint names.’75 
She went on to explain that, despite over twenty years of marriage and the use of their own 
names throughout the marriage, the practice of the Deeds Registry was to demand that the 
woman’s name reflect that of the husband if both were to be registered.  In a section entitled 
‘My Reaction’, she says: ‘I was appalled…’.76 In addition to feeling affronted, Doo Aphane 
went on to note that the provision violated sections 20 and 28 of the Constitution of 
Swaziland, which guaranteed equality before the law and guarantee women equal treatment 
with men.77  This was accepted by the Attorney-General and the High Court gave judgment 
for Aphane. In so doing, the High Court noted that the offending section of the Deeds 
Registry should be read as amended to permit the joint registration (in different names) 
desired by the applicant.78 
In bringing the appeal to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General did not dispute the finding 
of discrimination, but rather argued that the High Court was not empowered to change the 
law by severing the offending provision and substituting words, this being the task of the 
legislature. Instead, the Court should have noted the Constitutional breach and given the 
government time to remedy it.79 The respondent pointed out that this solution left citizens at 
the mercy of the legislature. She also queried why, four years after the promulgation of a 
Constitution guaranteeing equality, 16 (3) of the Deeds Registry Act was still on the books. 
She further noted the inequity of expecting citizens to litigate to remedy every 
unconstitutional law.80 The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court’s decision on the 




government to remedy the breach.  The Court declared section 16(3) to be invalid as it 
breached sections 20 and 28 of the Constitution on equality.81 The government was given 
twelve  months to change the law. Doo Aphane could return to the court if this was not done. 
The Deeds Registry was to register properties in joint names.82 
Commendable about the Supreme Court decision was its recognition that, although Aphane 
had brought the action in her personal capacity, the decision taken would benefit many 
women. Furthermore, the Court was also alive to the costs of litigation and considered that 
the State ought to pay the costs of the action in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. 
This is in important recognition of the access to justice barriers that face women and which 
prevent them from vindicating their rights.83 However, Cherif (2015: 166) is more 
circumspect in her analysis, noting that, while ratification of treaties may lead to gains for 
women in land rights, they do not necessarily translate into change with respect to 
discriminatory laws and in particular inheritance rights.  She further notes that, ‘[T]here is 
little to no evidence that advocacy may ameliorate the inequalities in women’s rights.’ This 
speaks to a lack of social legitimacy.84 While giving Aphane due credit for bringing the 
action, Langwenya (2012) identifies continuing discrimination against women married in 
community of property. She argues that the judgment did not get rid of the concept of marital 
power, meaning that, even if women could now buy and register land in their own names, 
they would still need the consent of their husbands when seeking loans from the bank, 
indeed, even when seeking to use their land as collateral. While Swaziland was quick to link 
its ratification of CEDAW in 2004 with an overhaul of its Constitution in 2005, it has been 
slower to repeal or amend other discriminatory laws. 
In its review of the combined first and second Swazi report to CEDAW, the Committee noted 
that, while the Constitution had been changed, the definition of discrimination in section 20 
needed further elaboration to include discrimination on grounds of marital status. 
Furthermore, the Committee identified the lack of progress in repealing discriminatory laws. 
Invoking the Aphane case the Committee expressed concern that: ‘the amendment to the 
Deeds Registry Act of 2012 following the ruling of the High Court in Attorney General v. 
Mary-Joyce Doo Aphane has not been widely disseminated among women and is being 
poorly implemented.’85 The Committee recommended that the State submit a post two-year 
review report on steps taken to disseminate the findings of the Aphane decision and also on 





The next national case was brought by a women’s rights organisation, Mifumi, which worked 
in Uganda.87 It challenged the practice of bridewealth, a pre-marital token of esteem given by 
the family of the groom to the family of the bride. While still computed in livestock, it is now 
more often paid in cash. Mifumi argued that bridewealth magnified discrimination against 
women.  It argued that women were compelled to stay in difficult marriages because of fear 
that if they left, their families would have to return the bridewealth. Moreover, Mifumi noted 
that bridewealth resulted in women experiencing violence at the hands of husbands who acted 
as if they were property.  In support, Mifumi cited the CEDAW concluding observations to 
the report of Uganda in which the Committee had called for the abolition of bridewealth 
which, to the chagrin of both the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, it called bride price.88 
Mifumi also noted that it breached the non-discrimination provisions of the Constitution89 
and also those provisions that called for women to be protected from discriminatory 
customary practices.90  It recalled Uganda’s ratification of CEDAW in 1985 and argued that 
there was an obligation under CEDAW article 2(f) to modify or abolish discriminatory 
practices. Mifumi also cited the African Women’s Protocol obligation on States to protect 
women from practices that violate their dignity.91 Mifumi argued that the requirement to 
return bridewealth before a divorce lowered the dignity of women, violating Articles 
31(1)(b),  32(2) 92  and 33(1) of the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court refused to hold that bridewealth was discriminatory or that it led 
directly to violence against women. The court pointed out that there was violence in countries 
which did not have the bridewealth practice. It emphasized that the giving of bridewealth was 
a voluntary arrangement between families which was popular. It did however find that the 
requirement for a return of bridewealth as condition of divorce did lead to women being 
forced to stay in unhappy marriages. The court agreed with Mifumi that the refund 
requirement undermined women’s dignity and violated their equal rights with men in their 
rights to enter marriage, during marriage and in the dissolution of marriage in breach of 
Articles 31(1) and 33 of the Constitution. 
Mifumi appealed the decision to the Supreme Court which confirmed the decision of the 
Constitutional Court. The practice of giving gifts at marriage did not constrain women’s 
ability to enter marriage, nor did it constitute discrimination against them. However, it did 




regard to the demand for refund of bridewealth as a condition precedent to divorce.  A 
dissenting opinion, which cited CEDAW articles 2(f), 16 (1) (b) and 16 (1) (c), found for 
Mifumi. Justice Esakaye noted that there was little choice for women but to agree to the 
bridewealth arrangements entered into by their families as a precursor to finalising a 
customary marriage.  Perceptively the judge noted the pressures that were brought to bear on 
women to enter into marriage on terms dictated to them by their families. They did not enjoy 
the freedom to enter into marriage as anticipated in article 33 of the Constitution and as 
enshrined in both CEDAW article 16 and the African Protocol.  She linked this to 
discrimination and found for Mifumi on all points. Chuma Himonga (2017) agrees with the 
majority in this case, arguing that there are some customs, including bridewealth, which she 
calls lobolo, which have cultural legitimacy, including with women. These practices should 
be respected. Clearly, she understands the acceptance of the practice as not causing harm to 
most participants. In a 2012 report on women and culture, the UN Special Rapporteur in the 
Field of Cultural Rights was clear that, while equality remained an inviolable norm, culture 
should not be denigrated as always exploitative of, or harmful to, women.93 It may well be 
that CEDAW will need to focus as much on the modifying part of article 2(f) of the 
Convention and less on a unilateral demand of abolition of practices which it may not always 
understand, but which women in the affected communities may support. 
VIII. CEDAW AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 
The number of African states that have ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW 1999 is 
small, but growing.94  The Optional Protocol is an addendum to the Convention. It allows for 
individuals or groups of individuals to bring complaints about violations of CEDAW by the 
State. It is necessary first to exhaust domestic remedies before sending a communication to 
the Committee.  There is also provision for an Inquiry process which allows the Committee to 
investigate serious or grave violations of rights that are systematic. The Committee issues 
findings and recommendations at the end of its consideration of a communication or at the 
end of the inquiry process. (See Connors, 2013).  The use of the Optional Protocol has been 
slowly rising.  However, knowledge of the Optional Protocol is not as widespread as of the 
Convention itself.  Its use is also constrained by the preference of national NGOs to develop 
and strengthen, by use, the regional system.  It is for this reason that organisations such as 




lawyers to find test cases to bring before the African Commission.  There has been a case 
involving  African women brought to CEDAW using the Optional Protocol.   
ES and SC v. Tanzania95 was brought by two widows who had successfully challenged the 
discriminatory customary law of inheritance that precluded them from either inheriting from, 
or indeed even administering, the estates of their deceased husbands. While agreeing that the 
provisions of the Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order violated the 
Constitutional provisions that guaranteed equality before the law, the Court had refused to 
declare the customary law invalid on the basis that it could not unilaterally change customary 
law from the Bench.  Their appeal was unreasonably delayed so the widows brought a claim 
to CEDAW alleging violations of articles 2 (c) and 2 (f) (equal protection through competent 
tribunals and also the abolition or modification of problematic customs and practices), 5(a) on 
stereotyping, 13 (on access to mortgages and economic benefits), 15(1) and (2) on equality 
before the law and 16 (1) (c) and 16 (1) (h) read together with CEDAW General 
Recommendations No. 21 o (b) family and 27 on older women.96   
Upholding their claim on all counts, CEDAW found that the women had indeed been 
discriminated against as they alleged.97  It noted the disadvantages experienced by these 
women, including their exclusion from participating in economic activity as well as the 
gender stereotyping at play. In addition to making a finding of all the violations claimed, the 
Committee added to the General Recommendations, General Recommendation No. 29 on 
property distribution and referred specifically to the paragraph directing States to prohibit the 
disinheritance of widows.98  The Committee recommended that the women be compensated 
and also asked the State to ensure compliance between national laws and the Constitutional 
and Convention requirements for equality between men and women. Having been criticized 
for its condemnatory approach to custom and culture, the Committee also displayed 
sensitivity, recommending that the State: 
(v) “Encourage dialogue by holding consultations between civil society and women’s 
organizations and local authorities, including with traditional leaders at the district level, with 
a view to fostering dialogue on the removal of discriminatory customary law provisions.”99 
The Committee also recognised the importance of educating not only judges in all levels of 
courts about the Convention and the Committee’s General Recommendations, but also 




This case will be particularly helpful in the articulation of property entitlements and equality 
of women under the Sustainable Development Goals.  It is noteworthy that both women had 
contributed to the acquisition of the family property that they were being denied by relatives 
who had not contributed anything but merely relied on a perversion of custom to seek to 
unjustly enrich themselves. Returning to the social change literature discussed in the first part 
of this chapter, one can see clearly the role played by the interveners who were able to bring 
the case on behalf of the women.101 Without them translating the women’s problems into 
violations ripe for remedy by CEDAW, the women would have been without a remedy (see 
Byrnes and Connors, 1996). 
There is a footnote to this case. In its consideration of the report of Tanzania in 2016, the 
CEDAW Committee noted its disappointment that the State had failed to implement the 
Committee’s findings in the ES case. The State also failed to provide information on what 
had been done to address the views of the Committee.102 The Committee reiterated the 
importance of repealing or amending discriminatory laws, including the Customary 
Declaration which had been the challenge in the ES case.  The Committee also reminded the 
State of its duty to provide education for both populace and office holders in order to 
transform attitudes.103 
Not wishing to end on a sour note, it is worth noting that, presenting its report to CEDAW, 
the Rwandan representative noted that, to make it more accessible, CEDAW had been 
translated into Kinyarwanda.104  Crucially, she noted that men had begun to see and support 
the benefits of women’s empowerment.105 Separately, CEDAW commended Sierra Leone for 
its efforts to regulate customary marriage and inheritance but noted that there was a lack of 
institutional capacity in the Ministry responsible for overseeing gender.106  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This article has tried to provide a snapshot of CEDAW in the African context.  It began by 
looking at literature on the impact of the ratification of human rights treaties on law reform 
and societal practice. Consideration was also given to the challenges of implementing family 
policy in States with plural legal systems which led to the question: can there be a universal 
understanding of equality? An examination and short comparison of the international and 
regional human rights systems suggests that there is not a definitive answer. The only clear 




enjoyment of their CEDAW rights, especially in the family. It is however true that the 
Convention is used for legal education and advocacy purposes by civil society and 
increasingly relied upon in court judgments. Nevertheless, government-led implementation of 
the Convention’s principles remains uneven at best, and poor at worst. This in turn makes it 
difficult to assess the efficacy of the Convention. The constitutional reform processes that 
have taken place, followed by some statutory law reform, gives some indication of the impact 
of CEDAW. Many States will continue to need assistance from civil society. Inter-state co-
operation will involve ‘peer pressure’ to do better and also practical help.  Importantly, States 
will have to ensure that the beneficiaries, the women, are well versed in their rights, and that 
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